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We study the relationships between firm financial structure and growth for a 
large sample of Italian firms (1998-2003). We expand upon existing analyses 
testing whether liquidity constraints affect firm performance by considering 
among growth determinants also firm debt structure. Panel regression analyses 
show that more liquid firms tend to grow more. However, firms do not use their 
capital to expand, but rather to increase debt. We also find that firm growth is 
highly fragile as it is positively correlated with non-financial liabilities and it is 
not sustained by a long-term debt maturity. Finally, quantile regressions suggest 
that fast-growing firms are characterized by higher growth/cash-flow 
sensitivities and heavily rely on external debt, but seem to be less bank-backed 
than the rest of the sample. Overall, our findings suggest that the link between 
firms’ investment and expansion decisions is far more complicated than 
postulated by standard tests of investment/cash-flow sensitivities. 
 
Keywords: Firm growth; Financial structure; Cash flow; Financial constraints; 
Gibrat law; Quantile regressions.  
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2 1. Introduction 
In the last two decades, a rapidly growing research has investigated the relationship between corporate 
growth and financial structure
1. Considerable attention has been paid to the hypothesis that firms are 
constrained in their expansion process by the lack of appropriate financial resources. The “financial 
constraints hypothesis” proposed by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) states that there is a wedge 
between the cost of internal and external funds because of asymmetric information problems between 
the firm and her external financiers. Capital market failures may eventually lead to the financial 
rationing of firms and, therefore, to a reduction of their investment spending capacity.  
A rich empirical literature has tested this hypothesis by focusing on the impact of cash flow on 
firms’ investment decisions and growth (see, among others, Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Fagiolo and 
Luzzi, 2006; Oliveira and Fortunato, 2006; Musso and Schiavo, 2008). This empirical strategy is based 
on observing that, in perfect capital markets, the availability of cash flow should not be decisive for 
firm investment decisions as firms do not pay any “lemon” premium (Myers and Majluf, 1984) for 
accessing external finance. Nevertheless, problems of asymmetric information might raise the cost of 
external finance and lead to credit rationing. In this case, the ability to generate cash flow becomes 
important for financing investment.  
A different approach is endorsed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997; 2000), who shed some 
scepticism on the interpretation of positive investment/cash-flow sensitivities as an evidence of 
financing constraints. Their results suggest that investment may react positively to cash-flow 
fluctuations even in the absence of financial constraints, as firms enjoy considerable degrees of 
freedom in choosing their preferred way to finance investment. According to this view, managerial 
behaviour and, more generally, the rules of corporate governance are important in explaining not only 
the use of cash in investment decisions but, more generally, the whole financial strategy of the firm.  
                                                 
1 See, among others, Fazzari et al. (1988), Whited (1992), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998). 
3 A rich stream of research in the corporate governance literature has emphasized how different 
dimensions of corporate finance may be affected by institutional factors such as tax and bankruptcy 
law, investors’ protection rules, legal efficiency, or the role of banks in the economic system (see, 
among others, Rajan and Zingales, 1995; La Porta et al., 1998). These studies have also emphasized 
that the type of financial strategy chosen by the firm is not neutral for firm’s future expansion 
decisions, as it importantly shapes managers/entrepreneurs incentives.  
The present study investigates whether and how a plurality of financial dimensions impact firm 
growth using a large sample of Italian manufacturing firms. We employ panel regression analysis in 
order to control for firms’ specific factors and quantile regression to capture the relationship between 
firms’ financial structure and growth at different points of its distribution. We find that, on average, 
more liquid firms tend to grow more. However, firms do not use their capital in order to expand, but 
tend to increase their debt. Moreover, we find that growth is, on average, highly fragile as it is 
positively correlated with the increase of non financial liabilities,  and not sustained by a long-term 
debt maturity. The relation among financial variables and growth is not constant across the distribution 
of growth rates: firms that grow more are characterized by higher growth/cash-flow sensitivities and 
heavily rely on external debt. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the background literature. 
In Section 3 we present the dataset and explain how we measure the relevant dimensions of firm capital 
structure. Section 4 focuses on the empirical analysis. Panel and quantile regressions are adopted to 
identify the relation between firm financial structure and growth at different points of the growth 
distribution. Further robustness checks are accomplished by adopting investment rate instead of firm 
employment growth as a dependent variable. Section 5 summarizes the main results and concludes.  
 
 
4 2. Theory and related literature 
Since the formulation of the Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Proposition (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), 
several theoretical and empirical models have demonstrated that in imperfect capital markets both firm 
value and investment decisions are strongly affected by their capital structure. The starting point of this 
literature is the observation that capital markets are far from being perfect, but rather are characterized 
by hidden information and hidden action problems (Arrow, 1979): entrepreneurs/managers have 
information that investors do not have, and investors do not observe all the actions taken by 
entrepreneurs/managers.  
Asymmetric information can generate a “lemon” problem (Akerlof, 1970) in both risk and debt 
capital markets. External financiers, who have a limited and incomplete information about firms’ 
project quality and return prospects, may charge a premium to firms issuing new shares or asking for 
new debt. Myers and Majluf (1984) have applied this concept to the problem of equity finance, where 
external investors are unable to identify the quality of firms and therefore ask for a premium to 
purchase the shares of good firms in order to offset the losses arising from funding lemons. A similar 
argument applies in debt financing, where credit institutions may charge an extra price on new debt 
issuance or even ration applicant firms.  
Agency problems between entrepreneurs/manager and external investors arise whenever the 
former undertake opportunistic behaviour in contrast with the interests of external financiers. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) have argued that interests of entrepreneurs and managers may diverge in several 
important ways from the interests of creditors. Managers may prefer riskier projects, have an incentive 
to issue a new debt senior to the existing one, by therefore increasing the risk for existing creditors. 
External investors, due to the impossibility to design complete insurance contracts against managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour so to offset moral hazard problems, may ask firms a higher price for the 
issuing of risk as well as debt capital.  
5 These considerations stand at the core of the “pecking order” or “financial hierarchy” models, 
which have postulated that the combination of internal and external funds is the product of firms’ 
financial strategies. According to these theories, companies adopt a hierarchical order of financial 
preferences, where internal funds are given preference over external ones in financing investment. 
The capital structure of firms is important in shaping managers’ incentives and affects the 
expansion patterns of firms. As argued by Jensen (1986), it should not be ignored that different forms 
of debts entail different governance effects, by providing different motivations to managers, and 
therefore influence real decisions of firms. There are several dimensions of firms’ financial structure 
that have been thought to be importantly associated with firm value and growth by different strands of 
theoretical and empirical research.  
A rich literature has tackled the issue of how the mix between internal and external funds is 
linked with firm real performance. According to the financial constraints and pecking order hypotheses, 
the availability of internal liquidity is a key determinant of firms’ ability to invest and accomplish the 
desired expansion plans (among the most recent contributions, see Almeida et al., 2004; Faulkender 
and Petesen, 2006; Pàl and Ferrando, 2006). A similar view is proposed by the trade-off theory put 
forward by Acharya et al. (2005), which stresses that the dependence of investment on cash or debt 
largely depends on whether the firm is facing an income shortage or, conversely, a high income state. 
The authors highlight that there is an interplay between firms’ cash and debt policies as cash holdings 
have a significant effect on financing capacity and investment spending in low cash-flow states, while 
debt reductions are a particularly effective way of boosting investment in high cash-flow states. A 
different approach to the issue of the relationship between firm financial policy and performance has 
been adopted by the corporate finance literature. In this view, external debt can be considered as an 
effective way to reduce the agency cost problems that may lead to the underperformance of firms 
(Jensen, 1986). Especially when cash flow is high, indeed, conflicts of interests may cause managers to 
6 undertake unprofitable investment or waste internal liquidity on organisational inefficiencies. In these 
circumstances, resorting on external financiers may provide managers the right incentives to avoid cash 
wasting policies, and thus finally result in firm better performances.  
Similarly, debt maturity should by no means be considered as neutral in terms of incentives for 
managers and entrepreneurs. In particular, short term debt has been considered to reduce agency 
problems between the firms and external financiers, as it entails a deeper commitment of 
entrepreneurs/managers not to distort investment (Myers, 1977). Moreover, short-term finance allows 
to pursue projects with positive net present value, while suspending unprofitable ones (Barclay et al., 
2003). Conversely, a short maturity may also have a negative effect, by impeding the planning and 
implementation of long-term investment. Consistently with this hypothesis, Schiantarelli and 
Sembenelli (1997) find that debt maturity positively impacts investment, profitability and growth of a 
sample of UK and Italian firms. 
A long and rich research has addressed the question of how the development of financial 
intermediaries, and especially banks, relates with the growth and innovation activity of firms.  Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) use industry level data to show that industries with the greater need of external 
finance, grow faster in more financially developed countries. Guiso, et al. (2004) use firm level data to 
show that smaller firms benefit more than large ones from financial development. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) show that firms grow at a faster rate, relative to a benchmark growth rate that 
would hold in the absence of external finance, in countries with a more developed financial system. 
Benfratello et al. (2006) use firm level data on Italian manufacturing firms and show that bank 
development fosters the innovation activity particularly for small firms and firms in high tech-sectors. 
Aghion et al. (2004) observe on the contrary that, in the case of U.K. publicly-traded firms, the most 
innovative firms barely rely on bank debt, but rather prefer other type of financing tools, such as new 
equity issuance. A more articulated view is proposed by Stulz (2001), who suggests that staged 
7 financing may be effective in reducing asymmetric information and opportunistic behaviour of 
financed firms. Banks do actually provide staged finance in the form of loans that may be renewed and 
expanded as entrepreneurs/managers ask for a broader financing. According to this view, the use of this 
type of debt can reduce information problems and thus improve the access of firms to external finance 
and increase their overall investment spending capacity (Semenov, 2006). As a matter of fact, the 
relevance of bank loans on the liabilities side of firms’ balance sheet can be either high or low 
depending on a number of factors both on the demand and supply side. Firms may choose to have a low 
(or null) bank debt or may be limited by the supply side, especially if the firm has a low risk ranking. 
The relation between the amount of bank debt and firm growth is interesting in that it reveals the role 
played by banks into the dynamics of manufacturing firms. A less developed issue in the literature is 
the link between firm performance and non financial liabilities. Among these, a considerable 
importance can be attributed to trade debt which, although not responding to specific firm financing 
strategies, may be important in relaxing firms’ financial constraints and expanding their spending 
capacity (Ferris, 1981; Emery, 1984; Brennan et al. 1988; Petersen and Rajan, 1996; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic; 2001; Boissay and Gropp, 2007). 
 
3. The financial structure of Italian firms: data, measurement issues and descriptive statistics 
We employ balance sheet-data of Italian manufacturing firms in 1998-2003 collected by Centrale dei 
Bilanci (CEBI)
2. In order to discard from the analysis all the phenomena related with self-employment, 
we remove from the sample firms with less than two employees
3. In order to avoid panel-attrition 
                                                 
2 The database contains balance sheet and asset structure variables for a large sample of Italian business firms operating in 
all economic sectors. Data refer only to limited firms whose accounting books, by the rule of Italian legislation, must be 
made publicly available at the Chambers of Commerce. CEBI collects the information, organizes them and perform 
preliminary data cleaning. In particular, only balance sheets complying with to the IV EEC directive are considered. For 
further information, see www.centraledeibilanci.com (in Italian). 
3 Bottazzi et al. (2006) show that firms with one employee radically differ from firms with two or more employees in terms 
of production structure. 
8 problems, we use a balanced panel of firms continuously operating over the observation period
4. Table 
A1 summarizes the industry composition of the final sample. 
There are many ways of measuring firm capital structure and, ultimately, the usefulness of each 
measure will depend on the purpose of the investigation. As the present study aims to assess how the 
dimensions of firm financial structure discussed in section 2 impact on firm real business activity, some 
proxies of firm liquidity, reliance on external debt, debt maturity and dependence upon bank are 
worked out from the available balance sheet data.  
In the first place, cash flow is adopted as a flow measure of firm internal liquidity. Firms’ cash 
flow has been calculated by the balance sheet collector (Centrale dei Bilanci), on the basis of detailed 
information on different flow items
5. Since cash flow is highly correlated with all proxies of firm size 
(the correlation coefficient between cash flow and value added, sales or employment equals, 
respectively, 0.83, 0.60 and 0.54) the ratio between cash flow and sales (SCF) is used throughout the 
analysis.  
Second, the ratio between equity and firm total assets (EQ) is employed as a stock measure of 
firm propensity toward self-financing or, conversely, reliance on external debt. Firms’ equity is mainly 
composed by own capital and retained earnings. Hence, the ratio between equity and assets is a proxy 
for the importance of a firm own resources in financing firm investment.  
In order to account for different sources of debt in the firm liability structure we build several 
indicators. Firm “total debt” is defined to be equal to the sum of all liability items except from equity. 
                                                 
4 We drop from the dataset firms that exhibited a yearly growth rate of employees lower than −200% or larger than 200% in 
any of the observed years, in order to weaken the problems that misreported data may introduce in the analysis. As a result, 
150 firms have been removed from the sample. The number of available observations in the balanced panel is 9315 per 
year. 
5 Cash flow shows a correlation larger than 0.90 with a simpler proxy obtained by summing up firms net profits, 
depreciation costs and the “Trattamento di Fine Rapporto” (TFR). The TFR is a fund where firms, by law, regularly set 
aside provisions that will be finally transferred to employees in the form of a “bonus” at their dismissal. We intentionally 
disregard the TFR at this stage of the analysis because, even if these provisions may be considered like a “debt” of the firm 
toward her employees (around 9% of total debt on average in our sample), their magnitude does not respond to any specific 
(either financial or commercial) strategy of the firm, but just mirrors the age distribution of employees as well as their 
turnover. 
9 The relative importance of financial debt, FD, is measured by the ratio between financial debt (defined 
as the sum of debts toward credit institutions, bonds and other financial debts) and total debt. The 
relative importance of bank debt in firm financial debt is captured by the share of bank over total 
financial debt (BD). Finally, the debt maturity structure is measured through the share of short-term 
over total financial debt (SFD)
6.  
Table 1 summarizes the definition of the financial indicators discussed so far. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 reports the mean value and the dispersion (as measured by the variation coefficient) of the 
distributions of SCF, EQ, FD, BD and SFD in different years of the sample period.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The descriptive statistics confirm some well-known features of the Italian industrial system 
(Vermeulen, 2002). For instance, debt accounts, on average, for more than two times firm equity in 
financing firm assets
7. Further, a very large share of debt has a non financial source. Third, Italian 
firms are largely dependent on bank debt, amounting on average to 77% of total financial debt. Finally, 
the maturity structure of firm financial debt, largely shifted toward short-term liabilities, may reveal a 
potential problem of un-balance of firm assets and liability maturity structure. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Short-term financial debt is composed by short-term bank loans and other types of short-term financial resources. 
7 International comparisons show that Italian firms have considerably lower equity-to-assets ratios than firms from other 
European countries (database BACH, European Commission). 
 
10 4. Empirical analysis 
In the vein of the post-Gibrat literature (Gibrat, 1931), we investigate the relation between firm 
financial structure and employment growth by estimating an “augmented” Gibrat-like regression 
(Fagiolo and Luzzi, 2006), where the financial indicators discussed in Section 3 are included among 
regressors. 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix among the selected financial variables in 2002 (correlation 
matrices turn out to be relatively stable across time). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The econometric specification we start from includes a quadratic term on firm size in order to 
capture possible non-linearities in the size-growth relationship, time dummies to get rid of the trend 
components (Dtime), sectoral dummies, defined as the first two digits in ATECO classification
8 (Dsector) 
and firm localization (by adopting a set of dummy variables, Dloc, corresponding to geographical macro 
areas North–East, North–West, Center and South of Italy). 
In order to account for possible delayed effects, the model contains lagged values of (scaled) 
cash flow. Hence the saturated model reads: 
 
22
i,t 1 i,t-1 2 i,t-1 3 i,t-1 4 i,t-1
5 i,t-1 6 i,t-2 7 i,t-3 8 i,t-1 9 i,t-1 10 i,t-1
11 i,t-1 12 time 13 sector 14 loc i,t
GROWTH log(EMP ) log (EMP ) log(AGE ) log (AGE )
SCF SCF SCF EQ FD BD
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where the growth rate of employees has been computed as: 
 
 








=    
 
The specification of the final model has been selected starting from the saturated model and following a 
general-to-specific strategy wherein non-significant regressors were removed according to likelihood-
ratio tests (see, e.g., Hendry, 1995)
9. 
 
4.1. Panel regressions 
Table 4 reports the pooled OLS, random and fixed effects estimation results of the final regression 
model, that takes the following form: 
 
2
i,t 1 i,t-1 2 i,t-1 3 i,t-1 4 i,t-1
5 i,t-2 6 i,t-1 7 i,t-1 8 i,t-1 9 i,t-1
10 time 11 sector 12 loc i,t
GROWTH log(EMP ) log (EMP ) log(AGE ) SCF
SCF EQ FD BD SFD
DD D v
ββ ββ
ββ β β β
ββ β
=+ ++
++ + + ++
++ + +
+
                                                
    (2) 
 
where the error term   may contain both unobservable individual effects, ( ), and idiosyncratic 
error, ( ), that is:  . Pooled OLS estimation is motivated by the weaker exogeneity 
assumptions made on the idiosyncratic error term: both random and fixed effects estimation use the 
strong exogeneity assumption that the unobservable component   is in each period uncorrelated with 
explanatory variables in each other period. However, pooled OLS turn out to be inefficient if the error 
term in equation 2 does contain unobserved individual components
i,t v i c
i,t u i,t i i,t vc u =+
i,t u
10. Indeed, Breusch and Pagan test 
statistic calculated after random effects estimation does reject the hypothesis of absence of individual 
 
9 A similar approach was employed in Fagiolo and Luzzi (2006). Detailed results for the selection procedure are available 
from the Authors upon request. 
10 We will further discuss the issues related with the possible presence of time-varying endogeneity  in the concluding 
section. 
12 unobserved effects. Both random and fixed effects account for the presence of   in the model. 
Although Hausman test suggests that fixed effects estimation has to be preferred, random effect results 
are also reported. Indeed, fixed effect estimation may lead to imprecise estimates due to the low 




[Table 4 about here] 
 
The estimation  results show a negative relationship between firm size and growth. The relation 
is not monotonic. Rather, the negative relation tends to vanish as the size increases (the coefficient of 
the quadratic term log
2(EMPi,t-1) is significantly different from zero in all the estimated specifications). 
Second, we do not find very consistent results on the relationship between firms’ age and growth. 
While the results obtained through the pooled and fixed effect estimations point out a negative relation, 
the within, fixed effect estimation detects a positive one. 
More interesting for our analysis, we find that the amount of cash flow is positively correlated 
with firm growth. This is in line with previous results by Fagiolo and Luzzi (2006).  
Notice, however, that the positive and significant relationship detected in the data by all 
estimation procedures might not mirror actual liquidity constraints to firm growth. Indeed, firms that 
grow more may be those endowed with larger cash flows, but it could well be the case that the causal 
relation runs the other way round than postulated by standard tests on the presence of financial 
constraints. The evidence of a positive relation between cash flow and growth can be better interpreted 
when accounting for other effects, captured through capital structure “stock” variables. Interesting 
enough, the estimated coefficient of equity-to-assets ratio is negative in the pooled and random effects 
                                                 
11 The first-order autocorrelation of these variables is higher than 0.90. 
13 estimations, suggesting that firms that grow more are less reliant on self financing, and rise more 
external funds, relative to their assets, than low growth firms do
12. 
As to the different types of debt, it is interesting to notice that the share of financial debt (FD) is 
negatively related with growth. This result confirms that non financial debt, such as firms’ provisions 
for pensions and other social obligations, as well as trade debt, give firms a valuable buffer of resources 
for financing growth. On the contrary, we find a positive relation between the share of bank debt (BD) 
and growth. Combined with the results on EQ and SCF, this might suggest that firms in our sample 
tend to use bank debt in order to expand, possibly using the amount of liquidity as a guarantee of firm 
solvency. Almost no role is found to be played by debt maturity structure on firm  growth: if any, the 
relation between firms’ debt maturity and growth is positive (even though very weak). 
Overall, our empirical findings seem to suggest that firms do not use their equity capital to 
finance their expansion. Rather, firms that decide to grow do so by creating new debt. Our results also 
emphasize that the growth profile of Italian Manufacturing firms is, on average, highly fragile: on one 
hand, it is positively correlated with the increase of non financial liabilities; on the other hand, it is not 
sustained by a long-term debt maturity.  This may be the due compensation between the two 
counteracting forces discussed in section 2, i.e., the positive relation between maturity and the 
implementation of long-term investment vs. the negative effect of maturity on agency costs. 
 
4.2   Quantile regression analysis 
Panel regression analysis estimates the relation between the mean value of the dependent variable (firm 
growth) and variations in the explanatory variables. It is possible, however, that marginal effects of 
changes in some of the variables in (2) are not equal across the whole distribution of firm growth. In 
other words, the estimated coefficients in Table 4 may be a poor estimate of the relation between some 
                                                 
12 The negative relation between equity-to-assets ratio and growth, although not supported by the within, fixed-effect 
estimation, may suggest that firms that decide to grow do not face a cost of debt as high as to dampen its exploitation. 
14 of the explanatory variables and firm growth, at different quantiles of its distribution. Quantile 
regression, introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978), is a useful way to overcome this problem, by 
providing estimates of the regression coefficients at different quantiles of the dependent variable. 
Quantile regression amounts to estimating the following equation: 
 
' ii yx u i τ τ β = +                                         (3) 
 
where   stands for the  
th quantile of the distribution of y. The distribution of the error term u i is left 
unspecified and the only assumption made is Quant  (u i | xi) = 0, which allows to write the conditional 
quantiles of y as a function of explanatory variables and parameters only: Quant (yi | xi) = xi’   . The 
estimate  l
τ β  of parameters in 3 is found by minimizing with respect to   the quantity: ii
i
uh τ ∑ , where 








u h τ τ
τ
> = −     (4) 
 
The estimate of the  
th conditional quantile is therefore given by n l (|) ' ii i Quant y x x τ τ β = . 
Quantile’s coefficient  k τ β  can be interpreted as the partial derivative of the conditional quantile of y 
with respect to one of the k






δ . This derivative quantifies the marginal 
change in the  
th conditional quantile due to marginal change in the k
th element of x (Buchinsky, 1998).  
15 Table 5 reports the results of quantile estimation. A sequence of quantile regressions was 
estimated for the 0.05, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.95 quantiles of the growth rate distribution and tests for 
equality of coefficients across quantiles were performed
13. 
The estimation results are interesting: first of all, we find that the relation between cash flow 
and growth is not the same across the whole distribution of growth rates. In particular, the cash-flow 
sensitivity of growth is significantly different for firms growing less or growing more than the median 
firm in the sample
14. Firms growing more than the median value (50
th percentile) show a significantly 
larger sensitivity to cash flow. This result is consistent with different, but opposites stories: on one 
hand, one could interpret the result by saying that firms with higher growth opportunities are also 
riskier from an external investors’ viewpoint, and therefore they may incur in credit rationing with 
higher probability than low growth firms. This will force high growth firms to use their internal cash 
flow in order to finance new investments. On the other hand, the result can be interpreted as a support 
to the view that cash flow contains information about investment, profit and growth opportunities of a 
firm: detecting a positive relation between growth and cash flow is therefore not a symptom of the 
presence of financial constraints to firm  decision to expand but, rather, a signal that a virtuous 
selection mechanism is at play in the market.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Second, the coefficient on EQ is not constant across quantiles of the growth rates distribution: 
in the case of equity-to-assets ratio, the coefficient at any of the growth rate quantiles are found to be 
                                                 
13 All elaborations were performed using Stata10
®. The command
 sqreg
 was used to perform quantile regression and 
standard errors were calculated using the bootstrapping method suggested by Gould (1997), with 100 replications. Scripts 
and data are available from the Authors upon request. 
14 F tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the SCF coefficient at the 5% or 25% percentile are equal to the 50% 
percentile at conventional significance levels (respectively, F test values are equal to 1.31 and 2.82). Similarly, no 
significant difference is found between coefficients at the 75% and 90% percentile.  
16 statistically different from any other quantile. In particular, the relationship between firms’ propensity 
toward self finance and growth is positive and significant for firms in the 5
th percentile, meaning that 
firms that are more reliant on own funds are those that grow less. As the growth rate increases, firms 
are found to use more and more debt. 
  As for the type of debt the firm is using, we find that  the negative relation already detected on 
the whole sample between the share of financial debt and growth is significant at all but the 95
th 
percentiles, suggesting that in firms that grow the most, contrary to what happens in the rest of the 
sample, the increase in the amount of financial debt relative to other types of debt is associated with an 
increase in firm growth rate
15.  
Some differences across the distribution are also found in the relation between growth and the 
share of bank debt: interestingly, at the 95
th percentile of the growth rates distribution there is no 
association between growth and bank debt.  
It is worth noting that the maturity of financial debt is positively related with growth in the first 
quartile of the distribution. No significant relation between the share of short-term financial debt, 
relative to total, and growth is found at upper percentiles. 
Finally, some differences are found in the relation between firm growth and the share of bank 
debt at different quantiles of the growth rate distribution: the most interesting result is that at the 95
th 
percentile of the growth rates distribution there is no association between growth and bank debt. As for 
the maturity structure of debt, it is interesting to notice that shrinking firms are those for which the 
more the term structure of debt is short, the less they grow. No significant relation between the share of 
short-term financial debt, relative to total, and growth is found at upper percentiles. 
 
 
                                                 
15 F test reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of FD at 5th and 25th percentiles are equal, while this is not the case for 
upper quantiles.  
17 4.3. Robustness checks: the relation between financial structure and investment 
Let us now turn to the last piece of analysis, by studying the relation between firms’ financial structure 
and investment. It is possible indeed that the fluctuations in the financial items that compose the 
liabilities structure of a firm do not have any sizeable impact on firms’ growth process as measured in 
previous section, and that firms’ employment growth is not an appropriate indicator to capture the 
impact of financial variables on firms’ real performance. We therefore focus on a “intermediate” 
indicator, i.e. investment rate, that is in principle more likely to respond to variations in the financial 
structure of the firm. We do so by estimating a different version of equation (2), where now firms 
investment rate in tangible assets
16 is included as the dependent variable instead of employment 
growth. 
The regression equation is therefore the following: 
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Results reported in Table 6 do not differ significantly from those shown in Table 4 as for the sign and 
significance of coefficients on cash flow, equity-to-assets ratio, and the share of financial debt.  
                                                 
16 We disregard investment in immaterial assets due to the noisy measurement of the highly heterogeneous components of 
this type of assets. 
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Firm investment is financed through debt. However, as already discussed, it seems that investment is 
supported by a particularly rudimental and fragile financial structure, with investment being positively 
correlated with the growth of non-financial debt items. Differently from the results on firms’ 
employment growth, the share of bank debt over total financial debt held by the firm is not found to 
affect investment.  
 
5.   Conclusions 
This paper is an attempt to extend the analysis of the links between firm financial structure and 
performance, beyond the traditional tests on financial constraints based on estimated investment cash-
flow sensitivities. In particular, the purpose of the analysis is to shed some light on several aspects that 
obtained very little attention in the literature, namely the relation between the liability structure, the 
sources of debt and the debt maturity on one side, and firm growth on the other.  
Our results suggest that Italian manufacturing firms, on average, do not use their own capital to 
finance their expansion. Rather, firms decide to grow by creating new debt. Our results also emphasize 
that the growth profile of Italian manufacturing firms is, on average, highly fragile: on one hand, it is 
positively correlated with the increase of non financial liabilities, on the other hand, it is not sustained 
by a long-term debt maturity.  
Interestingly enough, we find that the relationship among financial variables and growth is not 
constant across the distribution of growth rates: firms that grow more are characterized by higher 
growth cash flow and heavily rely on external debt, although growth in these firms seems not to be 
associated with an increase in non-financial debt, nor to be fostered by bank loans or credit lines. 
19 We believe that the contribution of the study is twofold: on the methodological side, we 
attempted to overcome the standard empirical approach aiming to work out the relationship between 
finance and growth only through average marginal effects, such as those estimated through standard 
panel techniques. A remark is in order: the analysis presented in the paper applies fixed- and random-
effect estimation, disregarding potential problems of time-varying endogeneity which might not be 
appropriately captured by the adopted estimation methodologies
17. The conventional way to overcome 
the problem is to rely upon GMM-type estimation. We followed this approach and estimated our model 
adopting (both difference and system) GMM. Unfortunately, while the estimated coefficients did not 
change sizably with respect to fixed-effect estimation, Hansen-Sargan tests clearly rejected the 
hypothesis of instruments validity, shedding some light on the capability of variables such as cash flow 
to proper instrument their own future values.  
Second, on the content side, our findings suggest that the link between firms’ investment and 
expansion decisions is far more complicated than postulated by standard tests of investment cash-flow 
sensitivities. Important factors, such as the characteristics of the banking system and  the development 
of financial markets may play a role. Firm heterogeneity should also be accounted for when 
investigating the finance-growth relationship at the micro level, since considerable differences in 
liquidity, capital and debt structure might be the outcome of specific financing strategies of firms, but 
cal also be determined by particular forms of governance, or by the characteristics of the market the 
firm is serving. In either case, these factors may importantly shape firms’ ability to expand in a way 
that might not be fully captured by the simple relationship between a firm’s cash flow and its 
investment.   
                                                 
17 As suggested by the autoregressive growth model adopted in Oliveira and Fortunato (2006), and firstly proposed by 
Goddard et al (2002), firm growth might entail a slow adjustment process. Moreover, it is possible that a more general 
problem of time-varying endogeneity affects our estimates, stemming from the presence of some time-varying confounding 
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Table2. Mean and variation coefficient of financial variables in 1998, 2000 and 2002 
   Mean  Variation Coefficient 
Variable  1998 2000 2002 1998 2000 2002 
SCF 0.069 0.071 0.068 0.922 0.955 1.136 
EQ  0.238 0.249 0.262 0.609 0.609 0.621 
FD  0.412 0.399 0.401 0.462 0.478 0.490 
BD  0.785 0.797 0.786 0.374 0.366 0.392 
SFD 0.674 0.683 0.684 0.435 0.423 0.428 
 
 
Table 3.Correlation matrix in 2002 
 log(EMPi,t-1) log(AGEi,t-1)S C F i,t-1 EQi,t-1 FDi,t-1 BDi,t-1 SFDi,t-1
log(EMPi,t-1) *           
log(AGEi,t-1) 0.150  *           
SCFi,t-1 0.154 0.023  *        
EQi,t-1 0.118 0.133  0.441  *      
FDi,t-1 -0.032 -0.035  -0.149 -0.369 *     
BDi,t-1 -0.076 0.010  -0.140 -0.181 0.084 *   
SFDi,t-1 -0.117 -0.060  -0.197 -0.184 0.026 0.229  * 
Note: all correlation coefficients turn out to be statistically different from zero at 
conventional confidence levels 
 
 
25 Table 4. Panel regression results. Dependent variable: GROWTH it. 




log(EMPi,t-1) -0.051***  -0.054***  -0.788*** 
 (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.064)  
log
2(EMPi,t-1) 0.004***  0.005***  0.024*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.008)  
log(AGEi,t-1) -0.015***  -0.015***  0.076*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.019)  
SCFi,t-1 0.198***  0.197***  0.141*** 
 (0.029)  (0.016)  (0.033)  
SCFi,t-2 0.063***  0.064***  0.076*** 
 (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.027)  
EQi,t-1 -0.037***  -0.036***  -0.004  
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.021)  
FDi,t-1 -0.028***  -0.028***  -0.047*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.012)  
BDi,t-1 0.012***  0.012***  0.024*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006)  
SFDi,t-1 -0.003  -0.003  -0.008* 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  
Dtime Yes  Yes  Yes  
Dsector Yes  Yes    
Dloc Yes   Yes    
Number of obs. 37260  37260   37260  
F test  22.98***  −    161.99*** 
Wald test  −     1222.65***  −    
Note: All estimation procedures account for heteroskedasticity 
at the firm level and autocorrelation of the error term. 
26 Table 5. Quantile regression results. Figures in round brackets below the quantile percentages represent the 
value taken by the dependent variable at each of the quantiles shown in the table. 
 
5% 25% 50%  75%  95% 
Variable 
(-0.161) (-0.037)  (0.000)   (0.067) (0.250) 
log(EMPi,t-1) 0.083  ***  0.007    0.003 **  -0.056 **  -0.275  ***
 (0.016)    (0.044)    (0.001)    (0.004)    (0.036)   
log
2(EMPi,t-1) -0.008  ***  -0.001 *  -0.001 *** 0.004 ***  0.025  ***
 (0.002)    (0.0004)    (0.0001)    (0.001)    (0.004)   
log(AGEi,t-1) 0.004    -0.006 *** -0.009 *** -0.020 ***  -0.045  ***
 (0.004)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.006)   
SCFi,t-1 0.198  ***  0.167 *** 0.145 *** 0.230 ***  0.297  ***
 (0.027)    (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.027)    (0.068)   
SCFi,t-2 0.092  ***  0.025 **  0.022 *  0.035    0.055   
 (0.025)    (0.012)    (0.012)    (0.027)    (0.062)   
EQi,t-1 0.048  ***  -0.007    -0.022 *** -0.066 ***  -0.161  ***
 (0.016)    (0.006)    (0.003)    (0.006)    (0.023)   
FDi,t-1 -0.059  ***  -0.029 **  -0.012 *** -0.022 ***  -0.020   
 (0.013)    (0.004)    (0.002)    (0.003)    (0.014)   
BDi,t-1 0.015  **  0.010 *** 0.008 *** 0.014 ***  0.011   
 (0.006)    (0.002)    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.008)   
SFDi,t-1 -0.023  ***  -0.005 **  -0.002    -0.003    0.014   
 (0.005)    (0.002)    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.010)   
Dtime Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Dsector Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Dloc Yes     Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Observations 37260     37260    37260    37260    37260    
Pseudo R
2 0.039     0.017    0.009    0.034    0.067    
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log(EMPi,t-1) -0.041   -0.041   -0.015  
 (0.032)   (0.014)   (0.246)  
log
2(EMPi,t-1) 0.004   0.004   -0.019  
 (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.027)  
log(AGEi,t-1) -0.032 *** -0.032 *** -0.087  
 (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.072)  
SCFi,t-1 0.185 *** 0.177 **  -0.063  
 (0.055)   (0.054)   (0.071)  
SCFi,t-2 0.127 **  0.129 *** 0.036  
 (0.051)   (0.051)   (0.074)  
EQi,t-1 -0.121 *** -0.117 *** -0.481 ***
 (0.023)   (0.022)   (0.095)  
FDi,t-1 -0.092 *** -0.088 *** -0.302 ***
 (0.017)   (0.015)   (0.017)  
BDi,t-1 0.006   0.006   -0.006  
 (0.012)   (0.010)   (0.028)  
SFDi,t-1 0.004   0.004   0.021  
 (0.011)   (0.010)   (0.024)  
Dtime Yes   Yes   Yes  
Dsector Yes   Yes   Yes  
Dloc Yes    Yes    Yes   
Observations 24748   24748   24748   
F test  19.70 *** −    50.56 ***
Wald test  −     749.69 *** −    
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Table A1. Industry composition of the sample 
 
NACE code   Industry  Number of firms 
15-16   Food beverages and tobacco  1030 
17   Textiles  820 
18   Wearing apparel and dressing  273 
19   Tanning  368 
20   Wood  products  210 
21   Pulp and paper  256 
22   Publishing and printing  232 
23   Coke petroleum and nuclear fuels  33 
24   Chemicals  551 
25   Rubber and plastic  602 
26   Other non-metallic mineral products  548 
27   Basic  metals  394 
28   Fabricated metal products  1098 
29   Machinery and equipment  1351 
30   Office machinery and computers  21 
31   Electrical  machinery  347 
32   Radio and TV  123 
33   Medical precision and optical instruments  210 
34   Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  194 
35   Other transport equipment  90 
36   Furniture  564 
   Total  9315 
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